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PORTUGUESE TIMOR: AN INDONESIAN DILEMMA 
DONALD E. WEATHERBEE 
Out of the clamor and heat of Sukarno's Indonesia's confronta- 
tion with the "Old Established Forces" emerged an image of a revolution- 
ary Indonesian foreign policy determinedly revisionist and implacably 
opposed to the maintenance or extension of Western power and influence 
in the Afro-Asian sphere. Sukarno's Indonesian Revolution was "actively 
opposed to, and hitting hard at, all forms of imperialism and colonialism 
wherever they occur."' Indonesia did not refrain from acts calculated to 
upset the status quo in Southeast Asia, and indeed justified them in terms 
of its anti-imperialist ideology. Yet, at the same time that Indonesia was 
claiming its place in the vanguard of the "New Emerging Forces," it 
accepted the tangible presence of traditional imperialism on its own door- 
step. Indonesia, the most aggressively anti-imperialist political unit in 
South Asia, is contiguous with, surrounds, and peacefully coexists with 
one of the two anachronistic vestiges of Portuguese Asian empire-Portu- 
guese Timor (the other fragment being, of course, Macao). 
D. G. E. Hall, surveying the impermanence of Portuguese dominance in 
Asia, wrote "Yet when all has been said regarding the moribund state of 
the Portuguese mpire at the end of the sixteenth century, the fact remains 
that, like Charles II, it took an unconscionable time in dying." 2 That it 
is in fact not dead within the territorial rea occupied by Indonesia is a 
piquant anomoly given the ideological bias of Indonesian foreign policy. 
An examination of Portuguese Timor as a problem for Indonesian foreign 
policy within the context of the proclaimed policy goals provides some 
insights into the determinants of Indonesia's revolutionary approach to the 
world, particularly the relationship between ideology and interest, as well as 
illuminates the possible future of Portuguese imperialism in the archi- 
pelago. 
Portuguese Timor 
Timor is the easternmost of the string of islands arching eastwards from 
Java to the Banda Sea which are known collectively as the Lesser Sundas 
(Indonesian: Nusa Tenggara). The entire island is about 300 miles long 
with an average width of 60 miles. Portuguese Timor consists of the east- 
ern half of the island (approximately 5,700 square miles), the coastal 
enclave of Occussi-Ambenu in western Timor, and the two islands of 
Atauro and Jaco, for a total area of 7,383 square miles (New Jersey-7,836 
square miles). The capital and only urban center is Dili (Dilli, Dilly) 
1 Sukarno, Political Manifesto, Independence Day Address, Aug. 17, 1959. 
2D. G. E. Hall, A Short History of South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1955), 
p. 206. 
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located on the north coast. The entire province is often referred to as 
Timor-Dili. 
The population of Portuguese Timor was recorded in the 1960 census as 
517,079, distributed unevenly, with an average density of 23 per square 
kilometer. Dili has a population of about 7,000. Although the 1960 census 
did not indicate the racial composition of the population, such data was 
included in the 1950 census, and there is no reason to believe that the gen- 
eral proportions have greatly changed. The 1950 figures are given in 
Table I. It should be noted that Timor has the lowest percentage of Euro- 
pean inhabitants of all of the Overseas Provinces of Portugal. 
TABLE I 
Composition of Portuguese Timor's Population in 19503 
European 568 
Mestico (mixed blood) 2,022 
Chinese 3,122 
Other non-indigenous (Goan, etc.) 212 
indigenous-civilizado 1,541 
indigenous-ndo-civilizado 434,907 
Total 442,378 
The distinction between civilizado and ndo-civilizado in Portuguese 
"colonial" practice has been important. The term civilizado denotes those 
individuals who may be counted as being culturally modern as opposed 
to traditional. Theoretically, the goal of Portuguese policy is to assimilate 
the indigenous people to the Portuguese way of life. This is euphemistically 
called achieving desired levels of economic and social progress. Of the 1950 
population only 7,471 (1 .8<,) of the total-i.e., all but the ndo-civilizado 
category in Table I-were classified as civilizado. Thus, less than 4/10ths 
of one percent of the indigenous population have been assimilated after 
more than three centuries of rule by Portugal. Of the total population more 
than 98%- are considered to be outside of the limits of western civilization. 
It was not until the first years of the 18th century that the Portuguese 
established a permanent administration on Timor.4 Portuguese interest in 
the island, however, dates back to the sixteenth century. Timor's sandal- 
wood was an important rade item and the Portuguese sent annual col- 
lection missions to the island. The Dominican friars also had established 
themselves in the eastern Lesser Sundas by the middle of the sixteenth 
3 These figures are given in United Nations Document A/AC.109/L.67, July 10, 1963, 
para. 5 1. 
4 The material on Portuguese Timor is drawn principally from the following sources: 
Timor-Background Paper Prepared by the Secretariat, United Nations doc. A/AC.108/ 
L.13, Dec. 3, 1962; William Burton Sowash, "Colonial Rivalries in Timor," The Far 
Eastern Quarterly, VII:3 (May, 1948), pp. 227-235; C. R. Boxer, "Portuguese Timor- 
A Rough Island Story: 1515-1960," History Today, X:5 (May, 1960), pp. 349-355. 
Since the preparation of this manuscript was completed, an American Universities 
Field Staff report has described the Portuguese efforts to modernize Timor. See Willard 
A. Hanna, "Reanimated Timor," AUFS, Southeast Asia Series, Vol. XIV, Nos. 7, 8 
and 9. 
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century. In 1962 the Dutch East India Company entered the area and began 
to displace the Portuguese. Competition between the Dutch and the Portu- 
guese in Timor was regulated by a treaty of 1661 that gave the Dutch the 
western part of the island and the Portuguese the eastern. Constant inter- 
necine warfare marked the history of the island. The Dutch mounted a 
number of pacification campaigns, and by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, had firmly secured themselves in the west. The Portuguese, 
although pressed not only by the indigenous wars but by the Dutch as well, 
did not strongly garrison the island. Their position was tenuous, resting on 
the ability to play one indigenous group off against another. 
During the Napoleonic Wars the British occupied Dutch Timor. The 
Dutch reoccupation after the war opened a new period in the history of 
the joint occupany of the island. Although both countries recognized one 
another's rights, there was a constant irritant over undefined boundaries. 
The Dutch would have liked to purchase Portuguese Timor but Portugal 
was only willing to negotiate boundaries. The long history of boundary 
discussions centered on the question of the enclaves held by both powers 
within the other's territory. A mixed commission working in 1898-99 
settled most of the outstanding issues, and a convention embodying the 
border agreement was signed at the Hague in 1904. However, a further 
difficulty arose concerning the eastern boundary of the Occussi-Ambenu 
enclave. This question was referred to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
and in 1914 a decision was handed down. From that point on, the boun- 
daries of Timor have not been called into question. 
The joint interest of the two powers in Timor, to the exclusion of third 
parties, received treaty status in a convention signed in Lisbon in 1893 in 
which inter alia Portugal and the Netherlands promised preference to each 
other in the event of the disposal of their rights in Timor. In the 1904 
Hague convention the signatories agreed not to cede their rights in Timor 
to any third party. 
Portuguese Timor was first administered from Goa and later came under 
the jurisdiction of Macao. In 1896, Timor was separated from Macao and 
became a separate administrative unit. It was not until after the final 
military pacification campaign in 1913 that civil government was intro- 
duced. With pacification came the introduction of commercial agriculture, 
particularly coffee, making use of forced labor. The European population 
of Portuguese Timor has always been small. For a time the territory served 
as a penal colony. After 1930 an effort was made to attract Portuguese set- 
tlers to the island for plantation development, but without much success. 
Although Portugal was a neutral in World War II, Timor did not escape 
the ravages of the war in the Pacific. It was occupied in turn by allied, 
Japanese and again allied forces, and the modest economic progress in the 
colony was set back. The Portuguese were able to reassert heir sovereignty 
after the war without difficulty. 
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By Portuguese law Timor is an integral part of the Portuguese Republic 
with the administrative status of an Overseas Province. Until 1951 Timor, 
as well as the other dependencies of Portugal, was a colony. In that year 
the constitutional framework of the Portuguese mpire was changed to incor- 
porate the extra-European territories into the state. Nevertheless, according 
to United Nations sources, "The relationship of . . . Timor to Portugal 
remains essentially a colonial one and the inhabitants of these territories 
have very limited participation in the central and local organs of govern- 
ment." ) 
As a partial response to the increasing volume of foreign criticism of 
Portugal's "colonial" policy, the Lisbon authorities have in recent years 
made an effort o create administrative structures in the overseas prov- 
inces more broadly based than in the past and to bring the indigenous inhab- 
itants of overseas Portugal into closer contact with local government. This 
was the main thrust of the new Overseas Organic Law of 1963 and was 
given specific application in the new Statute of Timor.6 In discussing polit- 
ical evolution in the Overseas Provinces, it is necessary, however, to remem- 
ber that the nature of the central government itself is the important 
determinant of the direction of change in the non-metropolitan parts of 
Portugal. Portugal is a corporative republic. The state is organized along 
highly centralized lines with interest representation being a function of 
the various corporative bodies. 
The chief governmental officer of Portuguese Timor is the Governor, 
appointed from Lisbon by the Council of Ministers.7 In 1963, for the first 
time, a Legislative Council was established. The old appointive Govern- 
ment Council was retained as an executive advisory body. The new Legis- 
lative Council has powers greater than the former Government Council 
had and shares some of the authority of the Governor. Membership on the 
Council is obtained by election following the Portuguese corporative pat- 
tern. 
Representation is indirect, therefore. After World War II all inhabitants 
of Timor were granted citizenship. This did not carry with it the right to 
a ballot. Suffrage was effectively restricted to the civilizados. As part of its 
attempt o give at least the semblance of greater participation in the polit- 
ical process to all inhabitants of the Overseas Provinces, the Portuguese 
government in 1963 promulgated a new electoral law that theoretically 
brought the ndo-civilizados into the electoral machinery. However, the 
qualifications set by the new law, particularly with respect to property and 
5 United Nations doc. A/5160, Aug. 15, 1962, para. 46. 
6 Estatuto Politico-Administrativo da provincia de Timor (Agencia-Geral do 
Ultramar, Lisboa, 1963). See also United Nations doc. A/AC.109/L.126, June 9, 1964. 
7 The governmental structure of Portuguese Timor parallels that of the other smaller 
Overseas Provinces: Cape Verde Islands, Macao, Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe. 
Angola and Mozambique have a somewhat different institutional framework. 
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tax requirements, are such that the indigenous people are still effectively 
debarred. One United Nations appraisal states: 
Even though the Native Statute has been repealed, the right o vote and 
to participate in the Legislative Councils and in the administration f 
the territories still appears to be related to the attainment of a degree 
of 'social progress' which in effect means the assimilation of Portuguese 
culture and the attainment of a Portuguese way of life.8 
Despite the new governmental look on Timor as a result of the dictated 
adjustments of the Overseas Organic Law of 1963 and the subsequent new 
Statute for Timor, in terms of control from Lisbon and lack of effective 
indigenous representation, little has been changed. The United Nations 
Special Committee concerned with Portuguese overseas territories has 
appraised the 1963 reforms in these words, "[It] does not make any sub- 
stantial changes in the powers of the organs of Portugal's government to 
legislate for territories which have been described previously.",' Unfortu- 
nately there does not seem to be any way to ascertain Timorese reaction 
to Portugal's rule, at least within Timor. In the various reports and papers 
from United Nations sources that treat Timor, one usually meets the rather 
resigned statement, "No information concerning political movements in the 
territory isavailable." 10 
The principal economic activity of the Portuguese Timorese is sub- 
sistance agriculture, chiefly shifting cultivation of maize with some wet rice 
culture. Timor is resource poor, and hopes for development have been ill- 
founded. The General Assembly of the United Nations has been told that, 
"In the post-war period there has been no significant progress in the eco- 
nomic development of Timor." Ad This statement was made in the middle 
of Timor's second five-year development plan (1959-64). The develop- 
ment plans, modestly financed (second plan-six million dollars) have con- 
centrated on the reconstruction ofthe port of Dili, resource development, 
and transportation. Public services in Timor are poorly developed, with 
the generation of electricity, transportation facilities, and communications 
being absent or inadequate outside of Dili. 
Despite a tariff-free market, only a small part of Timors' trade is with 
Portugal. The principal exports are coffee, which provides about two-thirds 
of the value of all exports, copra, and rubber. The largest markets are in 
Northern Europe. Although the volume of exports has been steadily rising, 
the province shows a persistent and sizeable deficit in its trade balance. 
8 United Nations doc. A/AC.109/L.126, June 9, 1964, para. 73 
9Ibid., para. 21. 
10 For example, United Nations doc. A/AC.109/67, July 10, 1963, para. 58; doc. 
A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962, para. 35. 
11 United Nations doc. A/5160, Aug. 15, 1962, para. 242. 
12Table 9 in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962, gives the trade 
figures for the decade 1950-1960. 
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The amelioration of this deficit would require not only increased invest- 
ment in the export sector of the economy but the development of local 
enterprises for import substitution. 
A word should be said at this point about another aspect of Timor's 
trade, and that is the illegal movement of goods across the border with 
Indonesia. Smuggling has been a recurrent theme in the Indonesian-Portu- 
guese relationship. Of course, part of what the authorities might consider 
illicit trade is a natural and free exchange by the indigenous people of Timor 
to whom artificial international boundaries have little significance. Further- 
more, it cannot be denied that some businessmen on the Indonesian side of 
the border have shown a preference for exchange gaining them escudos 
rather than rupiah.13 
The fact that economic and social progress in Timor has been so retarded 
can be attributed to a number of causes. Not the least is its physical isola- 
tion. Infrequent flights from Darwin and perhaps a dozen ships a year make 
it a fairly remote outpost of empire. A second factor has been the absence 
of a large European settler community. Thirdly, government revenue is 
limited, affording an ordinary budget of less than three million dollars a 
year. A final element has been the delayed recognition by the Portuguese 
government hat only with programs aimed at opening up the modern 
world to the traditional population of Timor will a climate for development 
be created. As the present Governor of the Province has stated, "It is no 
use in having technical advances and big material improvements hat the 
people cannot understand and take advantage of."> 14 
The key to a better life for the inhabitants of Portuguese Timor, if they 
remain Portuguese, is education, and thereby, assimilation. In 1950 the 
adult illiteracy rate on Timor was placed between 95-99%. What education 
there was in the non-urban areas was in the hands of the Catholic missions. 
Government schools were primarily for the civilizados. As late as 1960, it 
was estimated that primary school enrollment in the Province was only 
about 6%' of the total school age population. In February, 1964, changes 
were introduced in the education system to make primary schooling com- 
pulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 12. But, still less than half 
of the primary school age population is in fact in school. Part of the prob- 
lem is the lack of teachers and schools. There is also a question of the rel- 
evancy of curricula nd textbooks prepared primarily for the use of Portu- 
guese children in Portugal. It remains to be seen whether Portugal will 
have the opportunity to prove that its new resolution in Timor will produce 
a new society.15 
1-3 See "Remnants of Empire, II. Portuguese Timor," Far Eastern Economic Review, 
XXX:11 (Dec. 15, 1960), p. 585. 
14 Col. Jose Alberty Correia, as reported by Tillman Durdin in the New York Times, 
Dec. 13, 1965. 
15 Durdin, ibid. 
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Portuguese Timor in Indonesian Foreign Policy 
The continued presence of a colonial regime on Timor, notwithstanding 
Portuguese constitutional fictions, coexisting with Sukarno's Indonesian 
and NEFO resolutions at first glance could appear to mark Indonesian 
inconsistency of purpose. When viewed against the background of active 
policies against Dutch imperialism in West New Guinea and what, by 
Indonesian definition, was continued British imperalism in Malaysia, the 
restraint hat Indonesia has exercised toward Portuguese imperialism in 
Timor seems to be uncharacteristic. Although all of the ingredients of a 
course of action directed towards the expulsion of the Portuguese seem to 
be present, there has not been formulated an official Indonesian policy spe- 
cifically directed to the elimination of Portuguese rule on Timor. 
This does not imply an absence of Indonesian interest or lack of con- 
sciousness that a problem for Indonesian foreign policy might exist. Even 
before India had extinguished Goa's colonial existence, a move that high- 
lighted the egregious presence of the Portuguese in Timor, the Vice Chair- 
man of Sukarno's Supreme Advisory Council called on the people of Indo- 
nesia to "fill your hearts with hatred not only for Portuguese colonialism, 
but for all colonialism still existing on Asian and African soil," threateningly 
adding that Indonesia's "eyes and heart are directed toward Portuguese 
Timor and Goa," which, "are still under the power of colonialism." 16 
Indonesians have not been indifferent to the supposed plight of the inhab- 
itants of Portuguese Timor who, by definition, are "suffering" under alien 
domination. General Nasution has characterized the situation in Portu- 
guese Timor as one of "enslavement." 17 Former Foreign Minister Suban- 
drio attempted to use Timor as a hostage in the struggle against Portu- 
guese rule in Africa. Discussing Angola in the Indonesian People's Repre- 
sentative Congress, he warned the Lisbon authorities not to ignore the 
attitudes and temper of the Indonesian people because, "Indonesia lies so 
close to one of Portugal's colonies-Portguese Timor," adding the implied 
threat, "Do not wait until the Indonesian people's anger flares up." 18 But 
the Indonesian government has not stoked this particular revolutionary 
fire, and the verbal condemnations of Lisbon's policy and hortatory injunc- 
tions against Portuguese colonialism have not given way to substantive 
acts to eradicate vestigial Portuguese imperium in Southern Asia. On the 
whole, Indonesian relations with Portugal, at least in so far as Timor is 
concerned, have been correct, if not good. Since the Spring of 1965, how- 
ever, the relations between the two countries have been a state of sus- 
16 Ruslan Abdulgani, speech at protest rally on Angola, sponsored by the Afro-Asian 
People's Solidarity Organization, Jakarta, July 12, 1961. 
17 As reported by Antara, Dec. 22, 1962. 
18 Subandrio, statement to plenary session of the Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat, July 3, 
1961. 
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pended animation. A Portuguese spokesman has described relations between 
the adjoining territories on Timor as "cordial." 19 
Incidents and disputes have occurred along the borders of Timor which 
could have been construed by Jakarta as provocation and a pretext for 
a more aggressive policy if it had so desired. In mid-1962, for instance, the 
Portuguese government announced that two Indonesians and one Portu- 
guese had been killed in what were described as purely domestic border inci- 
dents. The official Indonesian news agency, Antara, on the other hand, 
charged the Portuguese authorities with "provoking trouble by creating 
tensions among the local people," kidnapping Indonesian citizens, incur- 
sions into Indonesian territory to steal cattle and goods, and smuggling. 
More serious accusations by Indonesia of Portuguese batteries firing on 
coastwise shipping were vigorously denied by Portugal and were not pur- 
sued by Indonesia. It is doubtful that much more should be read into the 
sporadic outbursts along the borders and the accompanying tensions than 
the frictions inherent in the nature of such a joint occupancy, complicated 
by the lack of ethnic definition along the frontier. 
Indonesian government officials in repeated public statements have 
recognized that Indonesian sovereignty does not encompass Portuguese 
Timor. Any claim to the territory has been categorically abjured. "We have 
no claims on Portuguese Timor, nor on North Borneo or on any other ter- 
ritory outside of the former Dutch East Indies." 20 On the occasion of a 
visit to Portugal in 1961, Sukarno reportedly assured Dr. Salazar that 
Portuguese rights on Timor would be respected. A United Nations "back- 
ground paper" on Timor sums the matter up as follows: 
For its part the government ofIndonesia has declared that it maintains 
friendly relations with Portugal and has no claim to Portuguese Timor, 
which has never been part of the Dutch East Indies and therefore is
not of the same status as West Irian [West New Guinea].21 
But the absence of a historically or legally viable territorial c aim to Portu- 
guese Timor does not rule out the development of a political claim based 
on criteria related not to the colonial past, but to the present and future. 
Although the spokesmen of the Indonesian government officially deny 
territorial mbitions with respect to Timor, there is abundant evidence to 
indicate that such ambitions do exist. Indonesian expansive nationalism, 
which some might define as imperialism, has been noted by a number of 
students of Indonesian foreign policy. There is no need to prove that mod- 
ern Indonesia is seeking to recreate the 14th century Majapahit empire to 
demonstrate a constant thread of expansionism in the ideology, if not the 
actions of the Jakarta government. One writer who has followed closely 
Indonesia's relations with its neighbors ums it up as follows: "In Djakarta, 
19 As reported by the Australian Broadcasting Commission, Jan. 19, 1963. 
20 Subandrio, as reported by Antara, Oct. 2, 1962. 
21 United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, Dec. 3, 1962, para. 35. 
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however, expansionist goals-known as 'Greater Indonesia'-do seem to be 
very near the surface of today's policies." 22 Portuguese Timor is a natural 
area of expansionist's interest. The author has spoken with Indonesians 
of various political persuasions to whom the acquisition of Portuguese Timor 
is seen as part of a territorial rounding out process. Indonesian attitudes 
toward Timor are not framed in terms of conquest, but rather the "recov- 
ery" of Indonesia irredenta. 
Any unofficial " iberation" policy which Jakarta may have had towards 
Portuguese Timor was one of irresolute indirection. For instance, the Indo- 
nesian authorities would look favorably on the emergence of political move- 
ments ostensibly originating in the Portuguese province aimed at over- 
throwing the colonial rule. With specific reference to North Borneo and 
Portuguese Timor, General Nasution has said: "We support their strug- 
gles, but do not claim their territories." 23 If the goal of the "freedom fight- 
ers" should be incorporation into the Indonesian state, Indonesia would 
not be unsympathetic. Ruslan Abdulgani, speaking as Minister of Infor- 
mation, has been uncontradicted in his statement hat, "Although we are 
not an expansionist nation we cannot allow people of common ancestry to 
be persecuted and thrown in prison merely because they want to unite with 
the fatherland of their ancestors." 24 Other Indonesians have been more 
specific: "If the people of Timor today or tomorrow started a revolution, 
... we would support hem.... After independence, if they wanted to stay 
independent, fine.... If they want to join Indonesia, we will talk it over."2" 
Actual efforts to create the conditions of an anti-colonial struggle on 
Timor have been tentative and apparently have aroused little enthusiasm. 
In early 1961, an organization called the Bureau of Liberation of the Timor 
Republic, located in Jakarta, called on the people of Timor to drive out 
the Portuguese colonialists. A United Nations report on Timor in 1962 
noted the existence of this Bureau (Committee), but stated that there was 
no information concerning political activity in Portuguese Timor. It was 
claimed in Spring, 1963, that "independence fighters" had set up a United 
Republic of Timor Dilly with a government of 12 ministers who had been 
secretly installed inside of Portuguese Timor in April. The release con- 
taining this information was signed by a person who styled himself the 
"Director General of the Presidium of the United Republic of Timor 
Dilly" and was made public in Jakarta. The report said that the "United 
Republic of Timor Dilly" was functioning as a nation and appealed for 
recognition by other governments. The requested recognitions were not 
forthcoming, nor has the "government" of the "republic" availed itself of 
22 Bernard K. Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia (Prentice-Hall/ 
Spectrum, 1966), p. 80. 
23 General Nasution, speech at rally at Purwokerto, Jan. 22, 1963. 
24 As reported by Radio Republic of Indonesia, Sept. 3, 1963. 
25 General Mokoginta in interview with Warren Unna, Washington Post, May 10, 
1963, quoted by Bernard K. Gordon, op. cit., p. 94. 
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the platform offered by the United Nations Special Committee concerned 
with Portuguese dependent erritories. Indonesia, other than offering facil- 
ities in Jakarta to the publicists of the Timor "liberation movement," does 
not appear to have given it much support. If the United Republic of Timor 
Dilly is in fact an autonomous political body, its representatives inJakarta 
have been well concealed, not taking part in the anti-imperialist rallys and 
programs that were once a feature of life in the Indonesian capital. 
That there may have been internal disturbances in Poruguese Timor dur- 
ing the year 1963 can be inferred from sources other than Jakarta. There 
was a troop build-up in Portuguese Timor beginning in the second-half of 
1962. A troop ship was sent to Timor with 1,000 soldiers termed replace- 
ments, but this force was reported to outnumber the entire Portuguese 
garrison on the island. In January 1963, Portuguese officials aid that 
defense forces consisted of a few troops only. It was not clarified whether 
this statement comprehended internal security forces as well as border 
forces. In May 1963, a member of the Portuguese Army staff, Col. Jose 
Alberty Correia, was appointed Governor of the province. In mid-1963, 
it was reported, but then denied, that elements of the Portuguese garrison 
in Macao were being moved to Timor. The defense budget for Timor was 
enlarged in 1963, reaching 29 million escudos, a figure qualling half the 
province's ordinary revenues for 1963. If there were the beginnings of inl- 
surrection it has been contained. No real armed threat to Portuguese 
authority in Timor has materialized. The Lisbon authorities apparently 
feel secure enough in Timor, both in their domestc control and their rela- 
tions with Indonesia, to justify continued expenditures in the development 
program, including a new emphasis on tourism. 
All of the factors appear to be present that would be conducive to an 
active Indonesian "liberation" policy. There is ample justification for the 
wresting of Timor from Portugal in the framework of Indonesia's revolu- 
tionary ideology. Timor is even a more obvious case of imperialism than 
Malaysia. The normative limits on Indonesian state action are few. Insofar 
as international legal obligations are concerned, the Indonesian view was 
succinctly stated by Sukarno: "Colonial rule over another nation, although 
perhaps formerly agreed in a certain international treaty, . . . must be 
got rid of as quickly as possible." 26 The precedent of Goa and external 
assistance to rebel groups in Africa indicate that any Indonesian Timorese 
adventure could be justified as defense against the "permanent aggression" 
of colonialism. In the atmosphere of hostility towards Portugal in the 
African-Asian world, the destruction of another bastion of the imperial- 
ists would receive general approbation. Furthermore, if this should result 
in the incorporation of Portuguese Timor into Indonesia, this would receive 
support as well. Revealing in this connection is a statement by the U.S.S.R. 
26 Sukarno, Political Manifesto, Independence Day Address, Aug. 17, 1959. 
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that for its part it regarded Portuguese Timor as Indonesian national terri- 
tory. 27 
Not only would the general ideological and moral climate in the anti- 
imperialist sphere be favorable, but the relative power positions of Portu- 
gal and Indonesia would not be inhibiting to Indonesia. Militarily, the 
liberation of Timor, weakly garrisoned in relation to disposable Indonesian 
forces, and so remote from Portugal as well as the Portuguese forces tied 
down in Africa, would not constitute a problem for Indonesia. Nor, as 
experience has shown, could Portugal expect direct assistance from her 
allies. 
Considering all of the above, we must conclude that despite aspirations- 
ideological and imperial-Indonesia has refrained from actively seeking to 
force out the Portuguese on the basis of an Indonesian determination of 
interest. That the liberation of Portuguese Timor does not have a high 
priority in the ranging of Indonesian-Portuguese r lations. There had been 
other, more immediate tasks set for the policy: first, the "restoration" of 
West Irian to the fold of the Republic, and then the attempt to foil the 
"neocolonialist plot" of Malaysia. A premature move against Portuguese 
Timor could have been injurious to Indonesian interest in terms of the 
accomplishment ofthese two more important asks. 
In the West Irian dispute, the Indonesian case was based on the claim 
that West Irian was an integral part of the former Netherlands East Indies 
and therefore continued Dutch possession was a deprivation of Indonesian 
territorial rights. West Irian was a part of Indonesia's colonial inheritance. 
Indonesia went to great pains during its diplomatic ampaign against the 
Dutch to stress the finiteness of its territorial mbitions. In the confronta- 
tion with Malaysia, Indonesia emphasized that territorial ggrandizement 
was not a goal; that it had no claim to Sarawak or North Borneo. "These 
are not part of our territory," Dr. Subandrio proclaimed, "nor is there any 
reason upon which such a claim might be based." 28 An aggressive policy 
towards Portuguese Timor might have destroyed the credibility of Indo- 
nesia's self-denying position on territorial expansion. It would also have 
increased the apprehensions of Indonesia's neighbors as to the ultimate 
goals of Indonesia in Southeast Asia. 
One of the uneasy neighbors is Australia. It has watched the develop- 
ment of Indonesian foreign policy with serious concern. The Australians 
came to the military assistance of Malaysia in the confrontation with Indo- 
nesia, despite Indonesian threats. One of the calculations which Indonesia 
would have to make in weighing decisions about Portuguese Timor would 
be Australian reaction. An aggressive policy towards Portuguese Timor, 
27United Nations General Assembly, Official Records, Fourth Committee, 1047th 
meeting, Nov. 11, 1960. 
28 Subandrio, Indonesia's Foreign Policy, reprint of article appearing in special issue 
of Le Monde, May, 1964. 
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whether for territory or in the service of anti-imperialism, would alert 
Australia to a real or supposed danger to Australia's role in the eastern half 
of New Guinea. It would immediately place in doubt the value of Indo- 
nesian guarantees of the inviolability of the New Guinea border. Doubts 
are already there, but at this stage of Indonesian national development, and 
in the flux of creating a new international political order in Southeast Asia, 
even a suspicious Australia fits better into the pattern of Indonesian state 
interactions than an actively hostile Australia. We suggest, therefore, that 
although given the non-interest determinants of Indonesian foreign policy, 
the liberation of Portuguese Timor was not attempted because it would 
not have furthered Indonesia's interests; in fact, it might have been in- 
jurious to interest in those areas of Indonesia's foreign relations that were 
assigned greater value. Interest, however, is not immutable. 
The Future of Portuguese Timor 
In a ringing declaration, the General Assembly of the United Nations 
has said: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development."29 Both the General As- 
sembly and the Security Council have determined that Portuguese policy 
in its Overseas Provinces is violative of that right. Portugal has been con- 
demned and sanctions have been called for, but Portugal has not been 
responsive to the African-Asian mood. In Timor the Portuguese claim that 
self-determination by the Timorese becomes meaningless if there are out- 
side (Indonesian) pressures. They can point to Indonesian attitudes about 
self-determination n West Irian for justification of this. Secondly, to talk 
of independence has no relevance in a discussion of Timor's future. It is 
difficult to imagine that the territory could live as an independent political 
unit in the Indonesian archipelago. Politics, geography, economics, and 
ethnic affinities militate against such a development. The Portuguese realize 
this. Salazar told the Portuguese National Assembly that given Timor's 
position in the midst of Indonesia, it would not live an independent life.30 
Nor can the Portuguese be expected to voluntarily transfer sovereignty of 
Portuguese Timor to Indonesia. Such a transfer would be, in their eyes, 
unjust, not only to Portugal but to the peoples of Timor. 
The persistence of a Portuguese role on Timor on the surface is a func- 
tion of nationalism, prestige, and a (newly emergent) sense of mission. In 
fact, the real heart of Portuguese resistance to any change in the status quo 
in Timor is its relation to the Salazar government's complete commitment 
to the maintenance of the Portuguese state intact. The erosion of the 
Portuguese position at any one point would weaken the entire structure of 
29 General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV), Dec. 14, 1960. 
30 These questions were raised by Dr. Salazar in his speech to the Portuguese Na- 
tional Assembly on June 30, 1961, as quoted in United Nations doc. A/AC.108/L.13, 
Dec. 3, 1962, para. 36. 
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the overseas policy and give ammunition to the growing number of dissi- 
dents in Metropolitan Portugal who are not identified with the empire. 
It is doubtful, however, that Portugal would be able to resist Indonesian 
pressures if they were transformed into an Indonesian policy actively work- 
ing for the ending of Portuguese rule on Timor. Timor is not Angola or 
Mozombique. There is no great economic value to Portuguese Timor. There 
is no large European settler community to complicate a transfer of sover- 
eignty. Timor is not defensible by Portugal. An Indonesian advance would 
probably encounter the same kind of resistance that the Indian army met 
in Goa. 
What are the possibilities for the development of an Indonesian forward 
policy? There is no demand for immediate action against Portuguese Timor. 
From the vantage points of geography, politics, power, and population, 
Indonesia is not in a comparative situation. It does not have to pre-empt 
a position in Timor. The only pressures for less restraint emanated from 
ideology. This was disciplined, bowing to current interests that put the 
question of Timor into the future. On the other hand, paradoxical as it 
may seem, the changed direction of Indonesian foreign policy towards 
Malaysia, and the emergence of a new government that must justify its 
authority, heighten the possibilities of an Indonesian move against Timor. 
The domestic Indonesian political requirements that produced confronta- 
tion with Malaysia have not really altered. The new leadership may find 
Timor a useful divertissement a some critical moment in the future. This 
is admittedly speculative. Less speculative is the assumption that when 
Indonesian ideology and interest converge in a Timor "liberation" policy, 
the Portuguese will be faced with the realities of power in the Archipelago. 
In conclusion, we can say that in a sense Portuguese Timor is a trust 
territory, the Portuguese holding it in trust for Indonesia. 
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